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1 Introduction
Decision-makers often have to choose between letting one agent be responsible
for two tasks, or letting two diﬀerent agents be responsible for one task each.
For example, when an infrastructure is designed (first task) and subsequently
built (second task), it has to be decided whether the same contractor or two
diﬀerent contractors should be in charge of the two tasks. For instance, in
the recent case of two new Ohio River spans, the only method allowed under
current Kentucky law is the traditional approach, which means that there are
diﬀerent contractors. Yet, also the alternative option of having one contractor
in charge of both tasks is currently discussed, which would require action by
the Kentucky General Assembly.1 In the case of the Port of Miami Tunnel, a
major construction project in Florida with an estimated cost of 1 billion U.S.
dollars, it was decided to let the private contractor MAT Concessionaire LLC
be in charge of both tasks (Miami Herald, April 17, 2010). Note that in both
cases, the two tasks have to be performed sequentially.
Related problems may also arise when a new government is formed. There
can be a single department responsible for diﬀerent fields, or there can be sep-
arate departments in charge of the diﬀerent fields. For instance, in the current
Government of New South Wales led by Premier Barry O’Farrell, there now is
a so-called “super-ministry” led by Andrew Stoner, who is both Minister for
Trade and Investment and Minister for Regional Infrastructure and Services.2
While the minister is responsible for both fields simultaneously, observe that
there may also be regional infrastructure projects that have to be established
first in order to facilitate subsequent trade, so the minister may also be in
1See The Courier-Journal, October 6, 2011, under the headline “Bridges authority delays
decision on how to build new Ohio River spans.”
2The Sydney Morning Herald (April 3, 2011), reported about the new government under
the headline “New faces: O’Farrell launches super-ministries.”
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charge of some successive tasks. Moreover, note that term limits in politics
may rule out that the same decision maker is in charge of diﬀerent issues that
come up over a longer time span, which means that there are diﬀerent agents
in charge of these issues, while the same agent might be in charge of such
consecutive tasks in the absence of term limits.3
In contract theory, there is by now a large literature on multi-task principal-
agent problems in the presence of moral hazard.4 Starting with Holmström and
Milgrom (1991), many contributions in this literature are focused on the trade-
oﬀ between insurance and incentives when agents are risk-averse. However,
as has been pointed out by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005, Sections 6.2.2 and 6.4), interesting multitask problems may
also arise when agents are risk-neutral but wealth-constrained.5 Traditional
multi-task models were focused on the fact that one agent engaging in diﬀerent
activities may lead to higher (lower) eﬀort costs when the tasks are substitutes
(complements). In contrast, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) assume that there
are no cost advantages or disadvantages when an agent performs two tasks.
Instead, they analyze the eﬀects of direct conflicts between the tasks.
Tasks are said to be conflicting (synergistic) when eﬀort exerted in one task
may reduce (increase) the probability that the other task will be performed
successfully. For instance, when an agent exerts eﬀort and comes up with
an innovative design, then this might either decrease or increase the proba-
3For an analysis of the behavior of U.S. governors facing term limits, see Besley and Case
(1995).
4For reviews of the literature, see Dewatripont et al. (2000), Laﬀont and Martimort (2002,
ch. 5), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6).
5On moral hazard problems with risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agents, see also
Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), and Tirole (2001). These models are “eﬃciency wage”
models in the contract-theoretic sense of Tirole (1999, p. 745) and Laﬀont and Martimort
(2002, p. 174). See also Kragl and Schöttner (2011), who study whether a principal should
hire one or two agents to perform simultaneous tasks in the presence of wage floors.
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bility that a building can be successfully constructed without exceeding the
budget limits (see Hart, 2003). As another illustration, consider a principal
who wants two goods to be sold. When the goods are imperfect substitutes
(complements), then successfully selling one product will decrease (increase)
the probability that also the second good will be sold.6
The punchline of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) is that when simultaneous
tasks are conflicting, then it is very diﬃcult to motivate one agent to exert eﬀort
in both tasks, so that it is better to delegate the two tasks to two diﬀerent
agents. In contrast, when the tasks are not conflicting, only one agent should be
in charge of both tasks, since then it is cheaper for the principal to incentivize
one agent (a bonus must only be paid when both tasks are successful). The
results of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) are intuitively plausible and they
were shown to also have bite in the laboratory in a recent study by Hoppe and
Kusterer (2011).7
However, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) consider only the case in which
the two tasks are to be performed simultaneously. In contrast, in the present
paper a variant of their model is studied in which two tasks have to be per-
formed sequentially.8 It turns out that then Bolton and Dewatripont’s (2005)
6See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2) and Hoppe and Kusterer (2011).
7Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) have conducted an experiment with 474 subjects. The
agents were salespersons who could promote one or two products. When the products were
substitutes, so that the tasks are conflicting in the sense of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005),
high eﬀort levels were observed significantly less often when there was one agent in charge of
both tasks compared to the case of two agents. In the absence of conflict, the principal was
better oﬀ when she hired just one agent, as predicted by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
8On agency problems with sequential tasks, see also Hirao (1993), Schmitz (2005), Khalil
et al. (2006), Kräkel and Schöttner (2010, 2011), Müller (2011), and Ohlendorf and Schmitz
(2012). Nieken and Schmitz (2012) provide experimental evidence. Yet, these contributions
do not consider conflicting tasks in the sense of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) which are
the focus of the present paper.
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results may be overturned. Surprisingly, if the tasks are in conflict, so that a
success in the first task makes eﬀort in the second task less eﬀective, then the
principal is better oﬀ when she hires only one agent in charge of both tasks. In
contrast, if there are synergies between the tasks, so that a success in the first
task makes eﬀort in the second task more eﬀective, then the principal prefers
to hire two diﬀerent agents for the two diﬀerent tasks.
The intuitive explanation for the novel finding is as follows. In the presence
of limited liability, the principal cannot make the agent pay a fine when there
is no success. Hence, the only possibility to motivate an agent to exert unob-
servable eﬀort is to oﬀer him a bonus when there is a success, so that the agent
enjoys a rent.9 In particular, when eﬀort is not very eﬀective in increasing the
success probability, then the rent that the principal must promise the agent
has to be large in order to give him an incentive to work hard.
Now consider a two-stage model. When exerting eﬀort in the second stage
becomes less eﬀective, it becomes more diﬃcult to motivate the agent in charge
of the second stage to work, so that the principal has to increase the rent that
she must leave to the agent when she wants to implement high eﬀort. Hence,
there is a new externality between the stages that is absent in a simultaneous
framework. When the tasks are conflicting, an agent who is in charge in both
stages now has an additional incentive to exert eﬀort in the first stage, because
by making second-stage eﬀort less eﬀective, he can increase the rent that he
can enjoy in the second stage. In contrast, when there are synergies, it is better
for the principal to hire two diﬀerent agents, because a single agent would now
be tempted to shirk in the first stage (and thus make second-stage eﬀort less
eﬀective) in order to increase his second-stage rent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section
9Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) use the term “limited liability rent” to distinguish the
rent in moral hazard models with wealth constraints from the related concept of information
rents that a principal has to leave to agents in adverse selection models.
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the simplest model that allows for sequential conflicting tasks is introduced.
Section 3 characterizes the principal’s optimal contract when she hires only one
agent (scenario I). The case of two agents (scenario II) is analyzed in Section
4. The overall optimal contract is derived in section 5, where the principal’s
profit in the two scenarios is compared. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a principal who wants two sequential tasks to be performed. The
outcome of task i ∈ {1, 2} is denoted by qi ∈ {0, 1} . If task i is a success
(qi = 1), the principal obtains a revenue R, otherwise her revenue in stage i
is zero. Two diﬀerent scenarios are considered. In scenario I, the principal
employs a single agent to perform both tasks, while in scenario II, she employs
two diﬀerent agents for the two diﬀerent tasks. All parties are risk neutral.
An agent has no wealth and his reservation utility is zero.10 Eﬀort on task
i ∈ {1, 2} is denoted by ei ∈ {0, 1} . An agent who exerts eﬀort ei incurs a
disutility of eﬀort ψei. The eﬀort levels are not observable.
The probability that the first task is a success is given by Pr{q1 = 1} =
α+ ρe1. The probability that the second task is a success is given by Pr{q2 =
1} = α + γq1e2. Throughout, we assume that the parameters α, ρ, γ0, γ1 are
strictly positive and α < 1 − max{ρ, γ0, γ1}, so that the expressions that
describe probabilities lie between zero and one. Observe that even if the agent
shirks, there is a success with probability α > 0.11 Moreover, it may depend
10Notice that if the agents were not protected by limited liability, the principal could
always attain the first-best solution by making an agent residual claimant; i.e. the principal
would simply leave her revenue to the agent in exchange for a suitable up-front payment, so
that the expected payoﬀ of the agent would be zero.
11Note that the first-best solution could always be attained if α were equal to zero, because
then in case of a success the principal knew for sure that the agent has exerted high eﬀort.
The principal would then just reimburse the agent for his eﬀort costs, so that the agent
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on the outcome of the first stage (q1) how eﬀective eﬀort in the second stage is.
Specifically, note that the two tasks are technologically independent if γ1 = γ0.
We say that the two tasks are conflicting if γ1 < γ0. In this case, a success
in the first stage makes eﬀort in the second stage less eﬀective (i.e., there is
a negative externality). In contrast, we say that the tasks are synergistic if
γ1 > γ0. In this case, a success in the first stage makes eﬀort in the second
stage more eﬀective (i.e., there is a positive externality).12
Note that since the two agents are identical, in a first-best world (i.e., if
eﬀort were contractible) it would make no diﬀerence whether the principal
hires one or two agents. Following Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), we assume
throughout that the principal’s revenueR is suﬃciently large so that she always
wants to implement high eﬀort. Hence, we can focus on the question in which of
the two scenarios the principal’s agency costs are smaller. To induce an agent
to exert eﬀort, the principal can oﬀer him a wage schemewq1q2 : = w(q1, q2) ≥ 0
that is contingent on the outcomes of both tasks.
3 Scenario I: One agent
Suppose first that the principal has hired only one agent to perform both tasks.
Since eﬀort is unobservable, the principal must ensure that it is in the agent’s
self-interest to choose high eﬀort. Hence, the agent’s expected utility when he
exerts high eﬀort (incurring eﬀort costs ψ) must be larger than his expected
utility when he shirks.
would make zero expected profit. In contrast, if α is strictly positive, there can also be a
success when the agent shirks. Hence, the principal must leave a rent to the agent, because
if the principal just oﬀered to reimburse the agent’s eﬀort costs, the agent would get zero in
expectation if he exerts eﬀort, while he would get a positive rent if he shirks.
12For example, the first task might be to build an infrastructure and the second task might
be to operate the infrastructure. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), innovations in
the first stage may either facilitate or hamper the operating eﬀorts in the second stage.
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Consider the second stage. The incentive compatibility constraints that
ensure that the agent exerts high eﬀort in the second stage are
(α+ γ1)w11 + (1− α− γ1)w10 − ψ ≥ αw11 + (1− α)w10
for the case that the first stage was a success (q1 = 1) and
(α+ γ0)w01 + (1− α− γ0)w00 − ψ ≥ αw01 + (1− α)w00
for the case that the first stage was a failure (q1 = 0).
Now consider the first stage. The agent is willing to exert high eﬀort in the
first stage if the incentive compatibility constraint
(α+ ρ)[(α+ γ1)w11 + (1− α− γ1)w10 − ψ]
+(1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)w01 + (1− α− γ0)w00 − ψ]− ψ
≥ α[(α+ γ1)w11 + (1− α− γ1)w10 − ψ]
+(1− α)[(α+ γ0)w01 + (1− α− γ0)w00 − ψ]
is satisfied.
The principal’s problem is to find a wage scheme (w00,w10, w01, w11) in order
to minimize her expected costs
(α+ρ)[(α+γ1)w11+(1−α−γ1)w10]+(1−α−ρ)[(α+γ0)w01+(1−α−γ0)w00]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability con-
straints wq1q2 ≥ 0. Since the agent always has the possibility to choose low
eﬀort without incurring any costs, incentive compatibility and limited liability
together imply that the agent’s participation constraint is always satisfied.
Note that the incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten such that
they read γ1(w11 − w10) ≥ ψ and γ0(w01 − w00) ≥ ψ in the second stage, and
ρ[(α+ γ1)w11 + (1− α− γ1)w10 − (α+ γ0)w01 − (1− α− γ0)w00] ≥ ψ
in the first stage. Thus, the following result can be proved.
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Proposition 1 Consider the case in which the principal has delegated both
tasks to one agent.
(i) If γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ ≥ 0, it is optimal for the principal to oﬀer the
contract w00 = w10 = 0, w01 = ψ/γ0, and w11 = ψ[γ0+ρ(α+γ0)]/[ργ0(α+γ1)].
Then her expected costs are [(α+ ρ)/ρ+ (α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ.
(ii) If γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ < 0, the principal will oﬀer the contract w00 =
w10 = 0, w01 = ψ/γ0, and w11 = ψ/γ1. Then her expected costs are [(α +
ρ)(α+ γ1)/γ1 + (1− α− ρ)(α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that it is optimal for the principal not to make a payment to the
agent when the second stage was not successful, regardless of the outcome of
the first stage (w00 = w10 = 0). Clearly, the principal does not want to reward
the agent for a failure. However, a second-stage success is rewarded even if
the first stage was a failure (w01 > 0). This is necessary in order to induce the
agent to work hard in the second stage, even when he was not successful in the
first stage (the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on
a first-stage failure is always binding). With regard to the bonus w11 that is
paid when both stages are successful, a case distinction has to be made. In case
(i), the parameter constellation γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ ≥ 0 is satisfied. This case
always prevails if the tasks are synergistic (γ1 > γ0), and it also prevails if a
conflict between the tasks is not too strong. It turns out that then the second-
stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on a first-stage success is
not binding; i.e., the wage scheme that motivates the agent to work hard in
the first stage is suﬃcient to also motivate him to work hard in the second
stage after a first-stage success. If the conflict is very strong, γ1 − γ0 may be
so negative that we are in case (ii). In this case, it is diﬃcult to motivate the
agent to work hard in the second stage following a first-stage success, so that
the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint then is binding.
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Finally, regarding the principal’s expected costs, observe that the principal
must leave a rent to the agent (i.e., she must pay more to him than 2ψ, which
would be necessary to reimburse the eﬀort costs), because a success might
occur even if the agent is lazy.13
4 Scenario II: Two agents
Suppose now that the principal has hired two diﬀerent agents for the two
diﬀerent tasks. Let agent A be in charge of task 1, while agent B is responsible
for task 2. Recall that agent A imposes an externality on agent B, since the
eﬀectiveness of agent B’s eﬀort (γq1) depends on whether (q1 = 1) or not
(q1 = 0) agent A is successful in the first stage.
The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that agent A chooses high
eﬀort in the first stage (given that agent B will be induced to exert high eﬀort
in the second stage) reads
(α+ ρ)[(α+ γ1)w
A
11 + (1− α− γ1)wA10]
+(1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)wA01 + (1− α− γ0)wA00]− ψ
≥ α[(α+ γ1)wA11 + (1− α− γ1)wA10]
+(1− α)[(α+ γ0)wA01 + (1− α− γ0)wA00].
The incentive compatibility constraints that ensure that agent B chooses high
eﬀort in the second stage are
(α+ γ1)w
B
11 + (1− α− γ1)wB10 − ψ ≥ αwB11 + (1− α)wB10
for the case that the first stage was a success and
(α+ γ0)w
B
01 + (1− α− γ0)wB00 − ψ ≥ αwB01 + (1− α)wB00
13To see this in case (i), recall that α > 0. With regard to case (ii), note that the condition
γ0γ1+(γ1−γ0)αρ < 0 can be used to show that (α+ρ)(α+γ1)/γ1+(1−α−ρ)(α+γ0)/γ0 > 2
must hold.
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for the case that the first stage was a failure.
The principal designs wage schemes (wA00,wA10, wA01, wA11) and (wB00,wB10, wB01, wB11)
in order to minimize her expected costs
(α+ ρ)[(α+ γ1)(w
A
11 + w
B
11) + (1− α− γ1)(wA10 + wB10)]
+(1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)(wA01 + wB01) + (1− α− γ0)(wA00 + wB00)]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability con-
straints wAq1q2 ≥ 0 and wBq1q2 ≥ 0. Note that these constraints again imply that
the participation constraints are satisfied.
It is easy to see that agent A’s incentive compatibility constraint can be
simplified to
ρ[(α+ γ1)w
A
11 + (1− α− γ1)wA10 − (α+ γ0)wA01 − (1− α− γ0)wA00] ≥ ψ.
Moreover, agent B’s incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten as
γ1(wB11 − wB10) ≥ ψ and γ0(wB01 − wB00) ≥ ψ. Thus, the following result must
hold.
Proposition 2 Consider the case in which the principal has hired two diﬀerent
agents to work on the two diﬀerent tasks. It is optimal for the principal to oﬀer
the contracts wA11 = wA10 = ψ/ρ, wA01 = wA00 = 0 and wB11 = ψ/γ1, wB01 = ψ/γ0,
wB10 = wB00 = 0. Then the principal’s expected costs are (α + ρ)[ψ/ρ + (α +
γ1)ψ/γ1] + (1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)ψ/γ0].
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that agent A is rewarded whenever the first stage is successful
(wA11 = wA10 > 0) and agent B is rewarded whenever the second stage is suc-
cessful (wB11 > 0, wB01 > 0), while the other wages are zero. All incentive
compatibility constraints are binding. Note that the reward that agent B gets
after a first-stage success (wB11 = ψ/γ1) is larger than the reward he gets after
a first-stage failure (wB01 = ψ/γ0) whenever the tasks are conflicting (γ1 < γ0),
and vice versa if the tasks are synergistic.
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Furthermore, with regard to the principal’s expected costs, observe again
that the principal has to leave rents to the agents, since a success might occur
even if an agent shirks.14
5 One agent or two agents?
We can now compare the principal’s expected costs in the two scenarios in order
to determine when the principal is better oﬀ hiring one agent or two agents.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the principal’s expected costs in scenario I are
smaller than in scenario II whenever γ1 is smaller than γ0. Our main result
can thus be stated as follows.
Proposition 3 (i) If the two tasks are conflicting (γ1 < γ0), then the principal
prefers to hire one agent who is in charge of both tasks.
(ii) If the two tasks are synergistic (γ1 > γ0), then the principal prefers to
hire two diﬀerent agents for the two diﬀerent tasks.
(iii) If the two tasks are independent (γ1 = γ0) , then the principal is indif-
ferent between hiring one or two agents.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The discussion following Proposition 2 has shown that when the tasks are
conflicting, then the wage that must be paid in order to induce high eﬀort in
the second stage following a first-stage success is larger than the wage that
must be paid following a first-stage failure. The reason is that with conflicting
tasks, a first-stage success makes second-stage eﬀort less eﬀective, which means
that in the second stage the agent must get a larger wage to be motivated to
exert high eﬀort. Hence, the principal can benefit from letting the same agent
be in charge of both stages. The agent will then have an additional incentive
14Notice that if α were equal to zero, the principal’s expected costs would again be equal
to the agents’ total eﬀort costs 2ψ.
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to work hard in the first stage, because of the prospect to earn a larger rent in
the second stage.
When the tasks are synergistic, the opposite holds. A success in the first
stage makes eﬀort in the second stage more eﬀective, so that the principal
must then pay only a small rent to induce high second-stage eﬀort. When the
same agent is in charge of both stages, the prospect to earn a higher rent after
a first-stage failure demotivates eﬀort in the first stage. In this case, it is thus
better for the principal to hire two diﬀerent agents for the two diﬀerent tasks.
Hence, Proposition 3 is driven by the fact that the second-stage rents de-
pend on the first-stage results. This explains why the sequential nature of the
tasks is crucial.
Of course, our results depend on the assumptions that we have made.
Recall that in the absence of wealth-constraints (or if α were equal to zero),
the principal would always implement the first-best solution without leaving
any rent to an agent. Hence, in this case she would be indiﬀerent between
hiring one or two agents. Note also that the conclusions reached depend on
the assumption that the principal’s return R is suﬃciently large so that she
always wants to implement high eﬀort. This assumption, which was is also
made in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), is most plausible if ρ, γ0, and γ1 are
not too close to zero.15
Finally, it should be pointed out that in case of conflicting tasks, it is the
success of the first stage which reduces the success probability in the second
stage. Alternatively, one could conceive a model in which it is the first-stage
eﬀort that reduces the second-stage success probability. In this case, the eﬀects
15For instance, if γ1 were close to zero and R were small, then the principal might not
want to induce high eﬀort following a first-stage success. In this case, the benefit of hiring
one agent when the tasks are conflicting that was highlighted in the model (i.e., the fact
that a large second-stage rent can be earned when the first stage was successful), would no
longer prevail.
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highlighted in the present paper would not occur. The assumption that the
outcome (and not the eﬀort) of the first stage is decisive for the eﬀectiveness of
second-stage eﬀort seems to be plausible in many applications. For instance, in
an infrastructure project the success probability in the building stage depends
on whether or not in the prior stage an innovative design was developed (and
not on how hard the agent tried to come up with an innovation). Similarly,
when an agent was successful in selling a product in the first stage, then
this outcome (and not the agent’s eﬀorts to sell the product) may reduce the
probability of also selling a close substitute.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that when agents are risk-neutral but wealth-constrained and a
principal wants to induce high eﬀorts in two sequential tasks, then for incentive
reasons she may be better oﬀ hiring one agent if the tasks are in conflict, while
she may prefer to hire two diﬀerent agents if there are synergies between the
tasks. The reason is that when the tasks are conflicting, then a success in the
first stage reduces the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort in the second stage, so that in
order to induce high second-stage eﬀort, the agent must get a larger second-
stage rent. The prospect to get this larger rent provides a new incentive to
exert eﬀort in the first stage, provided that the same agent is in charge of both
stages.
Our somewhat surprising results are entirely due to the sequential nature
of the tasks and they are thus in sharp contrast to the findings of Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005), who consider a framework where tasks are to be
performed simultaneously. In their framework, two diﬀerent agents should be
hired to perform two conflicting tasks.
Several avenues for future research seem to be promising. The model was
kept as simple as possible to highlight the eﬀects of moral hazard in a clear
14
way. In future work, the model could be extended to also cover adverse selec-
tion aspects, where agents have private information about their types.16 The
interaction of limited liability rents and information rents can be complicated
(see Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002), but might lead to interesting new insights.
Moreover, since the model is very simple, it might be useful as a building block
in more applied work. For instance, starting with Hart (2003) and Bennett
and Iossa (2006), several authors have recently pointed out that an important
characteristic of so-called public-private partnerships is that the two stages of
building and subsequently managing a public facility are delegated to one agent
(a consortium), while under traditional procurement the two sequential tasks
of building and managing are delegated to two diﬀerent contractors. While
the relevance of positive and negative externalities between the stages is also
a common theme in this applied literature,17 the eﬀects of conflicting tasks in
a moral hazard framework as analyzed in the present paper have not yet been
considered there. Integrating these kinds of externalities might lead to inter-
esting novel insights that so far have escaped the literature on public-private
partnerships. In particular, one could try to open the black box of contract-
ing within the consortium and thus investigate whether there are diﬀerences
between delegating a task to two diﬀerent agents or to one agent who then
subcontracts with another agent.18
16Models analyzing task assignment and job design from an adverse selection perspective
include Riordan and Sappington (1987), Dana (1993), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and
Lewis and Sappington (1997).
17See also Martimort and Pouyet (2008), Chen and Chiu (2010, 2011), Hoppe and Schmitz
(2010), De Brux and Desrieux (2011), and Iossa and Martimort (2011).
18See also Hoppe et al. (2012), who study subcontracting in an experiment on public-
private partnerships. It turns out that there may be subtle diﬀerences between subcon-
tracting within a consortium and direct contracting with the principal, because reciprocal
behavior tends to occur with regard to the party with whom a contractor deals directly.
These aspects have so far not been integrated in the formal literature on public-private
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Note first that w00 = 0 must hold in the solution to the principal’s prob-
lem.19 Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint for the second stage after
a first-stage failure now reads γ0w01 ≥ ψ. Note that in the optimum this con-
straint must be binding, w01 = ψ/γ0. The first-stage incentive compatibility
constraint can thus be rewritten as
ρ[w10 + (α+ γ1)(w11 − w10)− (α+ γ0)ψ/γ0] ≥ ψ.
(i) Ignore for a moment the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint
conditional on a first-stage success, γ1(w11 − w10) ≥ ψ. Then the binding
first-stage incentive compatibility constraint implies
w11 = w10 +
ψ/ρ+ (α+ γ0)ψ/γ0 − w10
α+ γ1
.
The omitted constraint γ1(w11 − w10) ≥ ψ is thus satisfied whenever w10 ≤
[γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ]ψ/ργ0γ1. Hence, we have found the solution in the case
γ0γ1+(γ1− γ0)αρ ≥ 0. Note that the principal has some freedom in choosing
w11 and w10 when γ0γ1+(γ1−γ0)αρ > 0, since there are multiple combinations
of these two wages leading to the (uniquely determined) minimal expected costs
[(α+ ρ)/ρ+ (α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ. Specifically, the principal can always set w10 = 0
and w11 = ψ[γ0 + ρ(α+ γ0)]/[ργ0(α+ γ1)], as stated in the proposition.
(ii) Next consider the case γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ < 0, so that the constraint
γ1(w11−w10) ≥ ψ must be binding. Hence, w11 = ψ/γ1+w10. The first-stage
incentive compatibility constraint is then satisfied whenever w10 ≥ ψ/ρ− (α+
γ1)(ψ/γ1) + (α + γ0)ψ/γ0. The right-hand side of this constraint is negative,
partnerships.
19To see this, assume that in the solution w00 > 0 would hold. Then the principal’s
expected profit could be increased by reducing w00 without violating any constraints, con-
tradicting the optimality of w00 > 0.
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since γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ < 0. Thus, the condition is always satisfied when
the principal sets w10 as small as possible, w10 = 0. Therefore, if γ0γ1 + (γ1−
γ0)αρ < 0, the principal sets w11 = ψ/γ1 and her expected costs are given by
[(α+ ρ)(α+ γ1)/γ1 + (1− α− ρ)(α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The incentive compatibility constraints of agent B are given by γ1(wB11−wB10) ≥
ψ and γ0(wB01−wB00) ≥ ψ. Hence, the principal will set wB00 = wB10 = 0, so that
the binding constraints imply wB11 = ψ/γ1 and wB01 = ψ/γ0.
With regard to agent A, the principal has to set wA00 = wA01 = 0 in order
to minimize her expected costs. The principal has some freedom in designing
the wages wA11 and wA10. All combinations of wA11 and wA10 that satisfy agent A’s
binding incentive compatibility constraint (α+γ1)wA11+(1−α−γ1)wA10 = ψ/ρ
minimize the principal’s expected costs. Specifically, it seems to make sense not
to condition agent A’s wages on the outcome of the second stage, wA11 = wA10 =
ψ/ρ. In any case, the principal’s expected costs are uniquely determined; they
are given by (α+ ρ)[ψ/ρ+ (α+ γ1)ψ/γ1] + (1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)ψ/γ0].
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider first the case γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ ≥ 0. Inspection of Propositions 1
and 2 immediately reveals that the principal prefers to hire only one agent in
charge of both tasks whenever
[(α+ ρ)/ρ+ (α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ
≤ (α+ ρ)[ψ/ρ+ (α+ γ1)ψ/γ1] + (1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)ψ/γ0],
which is equivalent to (α+γ0)γ1 ≤ (α+ρ)(α+γ1)γ0+(1−α−ρ)(α+γ0)γ1 and
which can be further simplified to γ1 ≤ γ0. Hence, the principal prefers to hire
one agent (two agents) whenever the two tasks are conflicting (synergistic).
Next, consider the case γ0γ1 + (γ1 − γ0)αρ < 0. Note that this case can
occur only if the tasks are conflicting (γ1 < γ0). In this case, it follows from
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Propositions 1 and 2 that the principal prefers to hire only one agent in charge
of both tasks whenever
[(α+ ρ)(α+ γ1)/γ1 + (1− α− ρ)(α+ γ0)/γ0]ψ
≤ (α+ ρ)[ψ/ρ+ (α+ γ1)ψ/γ1] + (1− α− ρ)[(α+ γ0)ψ/γ0].
This condition can be rewritten as 0 ≤ (α + ρ)/ρ, which is always satisfied.
Hence, the proposition follows immediately.
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